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THE PAINE-CONDORCET DECLARATION OF RIGHTS.
BY MONCURE D. CONWAY.
A HUNDRED years ago Thomas Paine and the Mar-
quis de Condorcet were engaged in writing a consti-
tution for France. Each could read but not speak
the other's language and the Marchioness acted as in-
terpreter, and perhaps assisted with her ideas. It is
probable that the Constitution so framed was the most
thoroughly republican instrument ever framed. It has
never appeared in English, but is printed in the works
of Condorcet (Paris, 1805). It was offered to the
French Convention in February 1793, but did not please
the revolutionary "Mountain," which really desired
no Constitution, but permanent revolutionism. Thus
the document has attracted no study, but it well de-
serves the attention of those interested in political phi-
losophy. I send you a translation of the Declaration
of Rights. It impresses me as far surpassing any
other instrument of that kind known in European or
American history.
"The end of all union of men in society being
maintenance of their natural rights, civil and political,
these rights should be the basis of the social compact
:
their recognition and their declaration ought to pre-
cede the Constitution which secures and guarantees
themT^
"I. The natural rights, civil and political, of men
are liberty, equality, security, property, social protec-
tion, and resistance to oppression.
" 2. Liberty consists in the power to do whatever
is not contrary to the rights of others ; thus the nat-
ural rights of each man has no limits other than those
which secure to other members of society enjoyment
of the same rights.
"3. The preservation of liberty depends on the
sovereignty of the law, which is the expression of the
general will. Nothing unforbidden by law can be im-
peached, and none may be constrained to do what it
does not command.
"4. Every man is free to make known his thought
and his opinions.
"5. Freedom of the press, and every other means
of publishing one's thoughts, cannot be prohibited,
suspended, or limited.
"6. Every citizen shall be free in the exercise of
his religion.
" 7. Equality consists in the power of each to enjoy
the same rights.
" 8. The law should be equal for all whether in re-
ward, punishment, or restraint.
"9. All citizens are admissible to all public posi-
tions, employments, and functions. Free peoples can
recognise no grounds of preference except talents and
virtues.
" 10. Security consists in the protection accorded
to society to each citizen for the preservation of his
person, property, and rights.
"II. None should be sued, accused, arrested, or
detained, save in cases determined by the law, and in
accordance with forms prescribed by it. Every other
act against a citizen is arbitrary and null.
" 12. Those who solicit, promote, sign, execute or
cause to be executed such arbitrary acts are culpable,
and should be punished.
"13. Citizens against whom the execution of such
acts is attempted have the right of resistance by force.
Every citizen summoned or arrested by the authority
of law, and in the forms prescribed by it, should in-
stantly obey ; he renders himself guilty by resistance.
" 14. Every man being presumed innocent until
declared guilty, should his arrest be judged indispens-
able, all rigor not necessary to secure his person should
be severely repressed by law.
" 15. None should be punished save in virtue of a
law established and promulgated previous to the of-
fence, and legally applied. A law that should punish
offences committed before its existence would be an
arbitrary Act. Retroactive effect given to any law is
a crime.
" 17. Law should award only penalties strictly and
evidently necessary to the general security ; they should
be proportioned to the offence and useful to society.
" 18. The right of property consists in a man's
being master in the disposal, at his will, of his goods,
capital, income, and industry.
"19. No kind of work, commerce, or culture can
be interdicted by any one ; he may make, transport,
and sell every species of production.
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"20. Every man may engage his services and his
time ; but he cannot sell himself ; his person is not an
alienable property.
" 21. No one may be deprived of the least portion
of his property without his consent, unless because of
public necessity legally determined, exacted openly,
and under condition of a just indemnity in advance.
"22. No tax shall be established except for the
general utility, and to relieve public needs. All citi-
zens have the right to cooperate, personally or by their
representatives, in the establishment of public tribute.
"23. Instruction is the need of all, and society
owes it equally to all its members.
"24. Public succors are a sacred debt of society,
and it is for the law to determine their extent and ap-
plication.
"25. The social guarantee of the rights of man
rests on the national sovereignty.
"26. This severeignty is one, indivisible, impre-
scriptible, and inalienable.
"27. It resides essentially in the whole people,
and each citizen has an equal right to cooperate in its
exercise.
"28. No partial assemblage of citizens, and no in-
dividual, may attribute to themselves sovereignty, to
exercise authority and discharge any public function,
without a formal delegation by the law.
"29. Social security cannot exist where the limits
of public administration are not clearly determined by
law, and where the responsibility of all public function-
aries is not assured.
"30. All citizens are bound to cooperate in this
guarantee, and to enforce the law when summoned in
its name.
"31. Men united in society should have legal
means of resisting oppression. In every free govern-
ment the mode of resisting different acts of oppression
should be regulated by the constitution.
"32. It is oppression when a law violates the nat-
ural rights, civil and political, which it should ensure.
It is oppression when the law is violated by public
officials in its application to individual cases. It is
oppression when arbitrary acts violate the rights of
citizens against the terms of the law.
"33. A people has always the right to revise, re-
form, and change its constitution. One generation has
no right to bind future generations, and all heredity in
offices is absurd and tyrannical."
BELIEF AND HAPPINESS.
BY CELIA PARKER WOOLLEY.
The relation of happiness to belief is a subject that
has occupied men's minds from earliest times, and is
as inevitable as it is important. My own thoughts
have been drawn to it anew by a letter lately received
from a friend, a young woman thoroughly alive to all
that the busy stirring life of to-day has to offer an ac-
tive aspiring mind like her own.
Like many others whom the thought of the ideal
continually sways, my friend has been strongly at-
tracted in the direction of modern theosophy, chiefly
interested, I suspect, in its general claim regarding
the essentially spiritual nature of the universe, and
less concerned with the special phenomena by which
it seeks to make good that claim. In words whose
ardent sincerity impresses a less susceptible and more
time-worn consciousness with a slight feeling of envy,
she describes the feeling of continuous abounding con-
tent that has been hers since this spirit side of things
has become a fixed mental possession with her. Life
has gained in worthy impulse and meaning on all
sides, and to a degree that imparts a positive physical
buoyancy as well as spiritual uplift and calm. Old
causes of discouragement and discontent have disap-
peared ; all that pertains to the merely temporal and
material side of things is now reduced to its relative
insignificance. Not that the sense of duty has grown
less, or the feeling of personal moral accountability
waned ; on the contrary my friend has for years been
actively engaged in the various reformatory and edu-
cational movements belonging to a large city, besides
being a busy and successful worker on her own behalf
in the world of business. But while following one of the
busiest and most exacting of professions she lives day
after day in the thought of the eternal and the infinite.
I hesitate to use these terms, spoiled, almost, by
the fulsome and sentimental use made of them in re-
ligion, where pious adoration has so long taken the
place of rational belief and the worship such belief has
power to inspire. They are the words, however, that
define the main reality to all thoughtful minds, words
also that postulate a certain kind of belief, of religious
belief let us say. The conclusion then seems inevit-
able that they are the words which point to the only
true, safe road of human happiness. I cannot but
think, if this is so, that the reason lies as much in their
moral as in their religious import; at least that this
former reason, if not yet fully recognised, will become
more apparent as man grows in clearer understanding
of himself. That noble belief of some kind constitutes
the only basis of true happiness may be readily ad-
mitted, but thought on these subjects is still too ob-
scure and tentative always to be clearly traced to its
beginnings, or accurately solved as to its outcome.
Admitting the merit of belief in this connection, it
is not so easy to determine either its origin or its final,
most important effecton men's minds. It is impossible
the last should not be of a varying degree and quality,
all the elements of individual temperament, disposi-
tion and training entering into the problem.
THE OPEN COURT. 3161
There is little doubt in my own mind that under
present tendencies of thought this belief on which hu-
man happiness is so dependent is losing its distinc-
tively religious character and becoming a kind as
rightly described, ethical. We have not yet begun to
surmise the true scope and significance of that term
;
though I am not among those who look to see it
wholly replace both the idea and the terminology of
religion. No doubt, however, the thought conveyed
by the increasing use of this word is one of widening
beauty and meaning to us all. It has won honored
place for itself in the field of theological discussion,
where once it was ignored entirely, and has become
the word of highest worth and meaning to a large body
of our ablest thinkers. Daily the ethical element in
religion is receiving more and more attention from its
special instructors, to say nothing of the unconscious
place and influence it is coming to hold over all minds.
It is worth while inquiring, then, whether the hap-
piness we all are seeking and seem to trace to some
form of religious belief, has not a nearer cause. May
not the rapidly-growing belief in our own kind, the
growth of the sentiments of human justice and kind-
ness of a true democracy, have much, perhaps most,
to do with an increasing sense of happiness ? Whether
they have or not, that is certainly a most exalting and
enticing thought which bids us seek the motive of
happiness in the love and increased well-being of our
kind. The noble beauty of George - Eliot's hymn,
"The Choir Invisible," must impress even those most
strongly dissenting from its philosophy, and its power
of inspiration is universally acknowledged.
As religion has profited by this infusion of the
ethical motive, deepening and enriching all its thought,
so it will be found has our general philosophy of life.
The questions of abstract philosophy will never lose
in importance and interest, but every step here taken
shows that it is the relations these questions bear to
practical life, the pressing problems of conduct, which
most endears and sanctifies them to the human un-
derstanding.
My friend is very far right therefore when she at-
tributes the free and happy state of mind in which
she now finds herself to a renewed conviction of the
reality of the unseen side of things, a freshly-clarified
spiritual vision ; but she does not yet realise what
measure of purely human love and aspiration enter
into these new beliefs ; how her own warm living per-
sonality is a part of that spirituality with which she is
striving to endow the universe and her own being, its
most potent factor indeed, so far as the present stage
of affairs goes.
But if my friend has missed the nearer in the more
remote conception, I make a still greater mistake in
setting one factor of human consciousness over against
another, dividing it against itself, when any true
means of comprehension lies in an exactly opposite di-
rection ; that described in the word "Unity," or as
The Open Coiu-t Y\ke.s better to define it, "Monism."
We cannot separate the ethical from the spiritual in
our analysis of men's deeds and motives, however
clearly they may seem to separate themselves in our
own mental workings.
The causes of happiness are as obscurely located
and as hard to define as the cause of life itself, and
perhaps it is well; since opportunity is its own chief
reward. The happiness and triumphs of life lie far
more in the pursuits it offers to heart, hand, and
head, than in any results one single struggling career
can attain. Belief does bring happiness then, but
along with belief in the worth of the world outside
ourselves, in some divine purpose ruling it to ends of
infinite beauty and wisdom, must go belief in our-
selves, as fit instruments for the attainment of those
ends, belief in the ethical not less than the spiritual
quality of the universe.
AN ANALYSIS OF THE MORAL OUGHT.
COMMENTS UPON PROF. H. SIDGWICK'S VIEW.
The question has been raised by ethical students.
How is it that man has the idea of "ought" at all?*
The ideas "right," "moral goodness," "duty,"
the "ought," etc., are fundamental notions of ethics.
As such they should be carefully defined
;
yet they are
frequently used by moralists without an analysis of
their meaning. Professor Sidgwick says in his article
"Some Fundamental Ethical Controversies," J//;/;^/,
No. 56, p. 4S0 :
" Different systems give different answers to the fundamental
question, ' What is right,' but not, therefore, a different meaning
to the question."
Professor Sidgwick adds:
"According tome, this fundamental notion is ultimate and
unanalysable : in saying which I do not mean to affirm that it be-
longs to the 'original constitution of the mind,' and is not the re-
sult of a process of development ; that is a question of psychol-
ogy—or rather psychogony with which I am not concerned : I
merely mean that as I now find it in my thought, I cannot resolve
it into, or explain it by, any more elementary notions. I regard it
as co-ordinate with the notion expressed by the word ' is ' or ' ex-
ists.' Possibly these and other fundamental notions may, in the
progress of philosophy, prove capable of being arranged in some
system of rational evolution ; but I hold that no such system has
as yet been constructed snd that, therefore, the notions are now
and for us ultimate."
* I owe the suggestion of writing this article to Mr. Salter. He takes the
view that the " ought" is an obligation of absolute authority residing beyond
facts and beyond the realm of science. Thus my attention was called to the
importance of an analysis of the ought-idea itself. Whether or not the ought-
idea is conceived as absolute, ultimate, and unanalysable is not a merely
theoretical problem, it is of practical importance ; for if we suppose that the
ought is absolute, ultimate, and unanalysable, we are prevented from inquir-
ing into its nature and come under the spell of a mysticism that debars pro-
gress and further philosophical research.
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The " ought " is most certainly a fact, or to use Pro-
fessor Sidgwick's words, it is "a co-ordinate with the
notion expressed by the word- 'is' or 'exists.' " But
he who attempts to describe the meaning of the
"ought" will find that it is neither unanalysable nor
ultimate ; on the contrary it is a complex fact of a very
special kind. The expression "ought " represents a cer-
tain relation among the ideas of a living, thinking,
and acting creature.
By "analysing an idea," I understand, as Professor
Sidgwick expresses it, "a resolving it into more ele-
mentary notions." All our notions are descriptions o'f
facts. Those notions which represent a complex state
of things accordingly are analysable, they can be de-
scribed as certain relations or certain configurations of
more elementary and more simple facts. Analysing
is at the same time classifying. The most elementary
and most simple facts would be those qualities of
phenomena which are a universal feature of reality.
And it is a matter of course that something that is uni-
versal can in its turn be no further subsumed under
more general views. Analysis as well as classification
ends with the universal and simplest qualities of exist-
ence.
The mind of a living being consists of many im-
pulses the origin of which is a problem that belongs
(as Professor Sidgwick declares of the "ought"), to
psychogony. Yet the subject is too important to be
left out in ethics and if Professor Sidgwick knows of
no system that can analyse such facts as the ethical
impulse of "the ought," it is highly desirable to do
the work.
* *
Impulses are tendencies to pass into action. To
pass into action is an incipient motion. What is mo-
tion?
Motion is change of place. Hydrogen and oxygen
when brought into contact show a tendency to com-
bine ; they exhibit an incipient motion. A ball placed
on a slanting surface will roll down ; it is going to
change its place and this state is an incipient motion.
The process of chemical combination and the rolling
ball are motions, but no actions; they are not deeds
of rational beings.
The word "action" is used in two senses, (i) to
designate the purposive deeds of rational beings ; and
(2) to denote a certain view of motion, which should
include every kind of efficiency, not only real mo-
tions, i. e. changes of place, but also pressures where
the effect of the action is to counteract another
action of equal force : thus the result of + i and — i
is a zero of motion, or rest. In this wider sense of
the word we speak of the action of oxygen upon other
elements and the action of a resting stone that exer-
cises a pressure. Action in the narrow sense of the
word, designating the deeds of rational beings, is a
very complex kind of motion. There is some addi-
tional feature in action. What is that additional
feature?
Action is purposive motion. What is purpose?
Purpose is the aim of the actor.
Has the rolling ball no aim? Yes it has an aim.
Motion cannot be thought without possessing a definite
direction. Every gravitating body has an aim. It does
not always reach its aim, but that is of no account.
Every chemical atom that combines with another atom
has an aim. Every piece of reality is acting somehow in
a definite way. The end of the direction of its action
is called the aim of its action. If there are obstacles
preventing a motion reaching its aim, the motion comes
to a rest. That is the end of the motion, yet not the end
of the activity of the moving body. The action of
the moving body (i. e. in the wider sense of the term
"action") continues in the shape of pressure in the
direction of the aim.
These processes are described by the physicist who
uses the terms kinetic and potential energy to repre-
sent the two forms of the activity of acting things. All
acting things are real. Their activity is that feature
which makes them real. Activity in this sense of the
term is called in German Wirklichkeit, and Wirklichkeit
at the same time means "reality."
Every motion havfng an aim, purpose must be
something more than "aim"; and indeed it is. Pur-
pose is the conscious representation of an aim. The
falling stone has an aim. If the stone were conscious
of its aim, we should say, that the falling stone has a
purpose.
This then is the main difference between motion
and action, between aim and purpose. Action (in the
narrow sense of the term) is conscious motion, and
purpose is a conscious aim.
Action and motion are different, but on the other
hand they possess something in common. The simi-
larity between action and motion is their spontaneity.
The gravity of a stone acts in a certain way ac-
cording to the stone's position. This gravity is a qual-
ity of the stone, it is part of its existence, it is its
intrinsic and inalienable nature. There is not a force
outside the stone that pushes it, there is no external
so-called "cause"* that makes it fall, but the stone it-
self falls. The stone falls because that is its nature,
and when lying on the ground it exercises a certain
* This wrong usage of the term " cause " has discredited the idea of cause,
so that philosophers rose to say, there are no causes whatever. Their inten-
tions were right ; there are no causes acting as agents upon things. But this
wrong usage of the term cause is no reason to discard a useful idea. Causa-
tion is transformation and the term " cause " should mean only the relatively
first motion in a series of motions representing in a certain process the start
of the transformation which can be arbitrarily selected, and " effect " the final
state of things with which the process ends. (See Fund. Prob. pp. 96—104.)
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pressure, because that is its nature. In certain posi-
tions this same nature, called "gravity," acts as mo
tion, in others as pressure ; but throughout it is spon-
taneous activity—spontaneous, because rising out of
its own being, and characterising its real nature.
This same spontaneitj' is found throughout reality,
in organic nature, and also in the conscious actions of
living organisms. The spontaneity of living organisms
is so immediate that men have always believed that
their actions (in the absence of compulsion) are their
own doing and that they are responsible for their ac-
tions. This state of things has been called freedom of
will. And certainly this conception is not based upon
error, it is true. Yet men noticing that actions per-
formed without the compulsion of others are spontan-
eous expressions of the actor's character, forgot that
this is true of all activity in nature. The light burns
because it is its nature to burn. The burning is spon-
taneous. The oxygen combines with the fatty sub-
stances of the oil in the wick not because there is a
so-called "cause" operating upon it, but because the
oxygen is a reality of a definite nature and to enter
under this condition into a combination with certain
atoms of combustible materials is this nature of the
oxygen. Its action is spontaneous just as much as a
man's action is spontaneous.
There is no reality but it is possessed of spontane-
ity, nay reality is spontaneity itself ; and the constancy
of this spontaneity makes it that natural processes, the
actions of men included, can be foreseen and prede-
termined ; or as the scientist expresses it that all na-
ture is governed by law—not that there were a law
from the outside imposed upon the world, but that the
nature of everything that exists is constant in all its
changes, that accordingly it exhibits regularities which
can be described in formulas called natural laws.
Natural law is no oppression of nature. Natural
law is only a description of its being ; and nature is
free throughout. Everything in nature acts not as it
must, but (to speak anthropomorphically) as it wills,
i. e. according to its own being.
* *
Man's actions are distinguished from the motions
of so called inanimate nature in so far as he is con-
scious of his aim. The aims of so-called inanimate
nature are not conscious, they cannot be called pur-
poses. Conscious beings alone can have purposes. The
problem of the origin of consciousness accordingly will
also solve the problem of the origin of purpose and
purposive action. We have treated the problem of the
origin of consciousness at length on other occasions,
which briefly recapitulated is as follows : *
Consciousness is a certain feature of our existence
which is best characterised as awareness. Conscious-
* See The Soul of Man, pp. 23-45
ness is not objective existence, it is not matter and
not motion : it is subjective existence. Consciousness
is a complex state of simpler elements and these simpler
elements are called feelings. The simplest feelings a
man knows of are perceived as awarenesses of certain
states. Feelings as they are perceived and known have
a meaning, and this meaning originates by comparison
with other feelings and memories of feelings. Feel-
ings represent something, and that which they repre-
rent is called the object. A feeling organism feels it-
self as a body, as an objective thing among things.
This body affects and is affected by other bodies and
it feels differently as it is differently affected. Although
other bodies like our own body belong to and are a
part of objective existence, we communicate with them
and cannot deal with them otherwise than by treating
them as possessing subjectivity. We regard them as
conscious beings like ourselves. Their feelings, their,
consciousness cannot be seen, but their whole attitude
indicates that their feelings are analogous to ours. It
is natural that feelings cannot be seen, or observed,
for they are not objective states but subjective states.
They are felt by the subject that is feeling. Our own
feelings would appear to others who looked into our
pulsating brain as motions, so it is natural that the
feelings of others can appear to us likewise as motions
only. Motion and feeling accordingly are the subjec-
tive and objective aspects of reality.
Every feeling is objectively considered a motion,
but not vice versa. Not every motion is a feeling.
Feelings are in their objective aspect very complex
motions. Yet while we do not say that every motion
is a feeling, we say that every objective existence, is
at the same time a subjective existence, and this sub-
jective existence which seems of no account in inor-
ganic nature, is no mere blank, it is, not feeling, but
potentiality of feeling ; it contains the germs of psy-
chical existence, and this leads to the inevitable con-
clusion that the world is throughout spiritual in its
innermost nature. That which appears to a subject
as objectivity is in itself subjectivity, that which ap-
pears as matter is in itself spiritual : either actual spirit
or potential spirit.
We can form no idea of the subjective existence of
inorganic nature, but its objective existence is grand
enough to satisfy us. The subjectivity of the sun for
instance may be as grand as the enormous amount of
energy that carries his Hght through cosmic space, an
extremely small part of which is intercepted by the
earth where it is the main source of light and life and
joy. Yet whatever be the subjectivity of inorganic na-
ture, apparently it does not consist in representations.
Representations originate only with the rise of feehngs
when feelings acquire certain meanings, and when sub-
jectivity becomes representative we call it mind.
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Living organisms, are active beings, and with the
rise of consciousness the aims of their actions become
purposes.
Suppose a conscious being were possessed of one
purpose only, his action would be determined by that
one purpose. Yet living beings are very complex and
the memory-structures of their minds will under cer-
tain circumstances naturally suggest in a rapid succes-
sion several propositions of which one only can be se-
lected as a purpose. The conflict among these several
propositions, which are called motives of action, will
cause a delay, this conflict is called deliberation, which
lasts until the strongest motive has overcome the re-
sistance of the other motives.
The strongest motive at any one moment is by no
means the strongest motive at other moments. Thus
actions are done which afterwards would not have been
done. If a man considers a former action performed
through a motive that has lost its strength, he pro-
nounces the verdict "I ought not have done it."
This "ought" is not as yet the moral ought. The
moral ought is still more complex.
If a man has a certain purpose and performs an
action in compliance with that purpose but fails in
realising his purpose, he says, I ought to have acted
otherwise in order to attain my purpose. His means
to the end were inadequate. If on another occasion
he follows the same motive, he says to himself, I have
more carefully to consider the means to the end I have
in view.
This idea of " I have to " is again an ought, but it
is not as yet the moral ought.
The choice among several motives to do a thing,
or among several ways of doing a thing is the condi-
tion of any ought. The idea that this or that will have
to be regretted or will fail, that another thing will not
have to be regretted and will succeed, leads to the
formulation of rules. These rules appear to him who
has the intention to obey them, as an ought.
It is natural that those motives which promise
pleasure are stronger than others. Almost all the rules
of ought are to protect a man against the temptation
of his pleasure-promising motives.
The idea of ought in general is a very complex
idea, yet the moral ought is still more complex. What
is the moral ought?
Man is a social animal. Society is not merely a
collection of individuals, but the individual is a pro-
duct of society. An individual that is prompted by
egotistic motives alone will always fail in the end ; and
suppose that a certain man's fate were an exception,
that he succeeded by a favorable combination of cir-
cumstances, death will defeat him after all.
A man in whom the idea of his being a member of
a family, of a nation, of humanity, is a live presence.
will feel bound to stand up for the common welfare
with equal or even more energy than for his private
interests. He is impressed with the importance that
everyone in his place has to attend to the work al-
lotted him, and he himself will be serious in the per-
formance of what he is wont to call duty.
Duty is formulated as a norm or a prescript which
is to be the highest motive for action and the intent
of the moral man is to make it unbendingly strong so
as to overrule all other considerations.
*
* *
To sum up :
We have seen that the moral ought is not unana-
lysable, it is not an ultimate notion. It is a very com-
plex mental fact which admits of analysis and a de-
scription of both its origin and its nature. The moral
ought is a special kind of any ought or of any rule of
action devised for the guidance of conduct. Conduct is
a special case of natural processes ; it is a motion plus
purpose, purpose being an aim pursued with conscious
intention. And aim, again, is one constituent feature
of motion. There is no motion without aim. The
ought grows from the realm of inorganic existence to-
gether with the unfolding of mind in animal organ-
isms and it reaches its grandest development in the
moral ideals of man.
Professor Sidgwick has sufficiently guarded his
statement, saying that "he merely means he cannot now
resolve it into or explain it by any more elementary
elements. Nevertheless it is not advisable to deal
with a fundamental idea as if it were unexplain-
able or unanalysable and thus cast the glamor of mys-
ticism over the whole realm of the most important and
practical of sciences. There are ethical students who
follow blindly the authority of such a great teacher as is
Professor Sidgwick and they are too apt to forget the
cautious limitation of his words preaching the mystery
of the ought in its transcendent incomprehensibility.
There are always minds who love to live in the
twilight of thought, who think that the unintelligible
is grander than that which can be understood; and
these minds seize eagerly upon every expression that
throws a shadow on science, that dwarfs philosophy,
and makes human knowledge appear dull and useless.
p. c.
CURRENT TOPICS.
Yesterday was Washington's birthday, and the celebration
of it as described in the papers of this morning, was inspired by
such an exuberant and thrifty patriotism as must e.xcite the won-
der of the world. At Albany the Democrats assembled in honor .
of the day, and tagged their platitudinous platform to the tail of
Washington's coat ; under the belief, not altogether vain, that
some people with votes to give, will honor it as a piece of the
original garment. At Detroit the Republicans adopted the same
stratagem
; and at St. Louis, the People's Party, or whatever the
name of it is, did the same thing. Under the guise of patriotism.
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each of them pressed the memory of Washington into the service
of party ; and all of them spent the day in coining the glorious
legacy left by Washington to all his countrymen into political
capital for themselves. Are there not enough days for faction
outside of Washington's birthday ? In Chicago the great theme
was not profaned by party politics. We asked nothing of the
mighty shade of Washington, except a little help in Congress for
the benefit of the World's fair.
Political contradictions enough to fill the old curiosity shop
were offered up yesterday at the shrine of Washington, and his
festival day was principally devoted to the science of "winning
elections." In the name of Washington, Senator Hill spoke to
the democrats at Albany, and referring to the tariff, he said, " It
is a maxim of sound policy better fitted to win elections than to
lose them ; better dividing into easy chapters the lessons of a long
campaign of education, abolish whenever you can one after an-
other, one indefensible tax at a time." The sentiment and the
grammar of that " maxim " are both bad, although not any worse
than those proclaimed by the republicans at Detroit, and by the
People's party at St. Louis. While Mr. Hill at Albany was " im-
proving the occasion" to declare his policy, Mr. McKinley at De-
troit was covering it with ridicule, as if it were a mere motion for
continuance, or some other dilatory plea ; an excuse for treachery
or cowardice. In rollicking banter, Mr. McKinley said, "The
democratic party will not repeal the tariff in twenty-five years.
They have started in to repeal it item by item, and there are two
thousand five hundred items in it." And thus it was that party




"A plague on both your houses," exclaimed the People's con-
vention at St. Louis, also in the name of Washington ; and with
no better taste than the others, the third party thre^ in its little
contribution to the discords of the day. Said the tautological Mr.
Folk, the President of the convention, " We want relief, we de-
mand that we have relief, we will have relief, and I repeat, we
must have relief, if we have to wipe out the two old parties from
the face of the earth." This threat of wiping out the two old par-
ties ought to have general approval ; and on any other day than
Washington's birthday I rather think it would be a beneficial
thing, but considering that the "two old parties" include within
them about nineteen twentieths of all the people, it will not be an
easy task for Mr. Polk to wipe them out, although Mr. Ignatius
Donnelly offered to perform a still more difficult feat. He agreed
to " wipe the Mason and Dixon line out of the geography, and the
color line out of politics." Mr. Donnelly would also undertake
for a very small wager to wipe out the ecliptic, and pull up the
North pole.
Chicago honored the day by patriotic exercises at the public
schools, by appropriate services in the churches, by civic ban-
quets of great magnificence, by generous hospitality to senators
and representatives from Washington, and by a great meeting at
the Auditorium addressed by Gen. Stewart Woodford, of New
York, a very eloquent orator. From the life, character, and
work of Washington, General Woodford drew a beautiful moral,
wherein he showed that it was the duty of Congress to make a
liberal appropriation for the World's Fair. "We want no un-
seemly, wasteful, and barbaric extravagance." he said. " and we
will tolerate no pitiful, niggardly, and miserly meanness." This,
from a citizen of New York was very magnanimous ; and the same
feeling was manifested by the guests from other states, who. in
the figurative language of one of the reporters, were "sojourning
within the gates."
Generous as was the before dinner oratory of General Wood-
ford, it was parsimonious economy when compared with the after
dinner eloquence of the clubs, a gushing artesian well whose boun-
tiful flow actually persuaded the people of Chicago that we were
too modest in asking Congress for only five million dollars, when
we might have had fifty millions. Mr. Doan, a member from Ohio,
said that he had " heard a congressman say just after dinner that
he was willing to vote a hundred million dollars to Chicago."
Judging from the " Menu," which by the way, was published in
the papers, I should think that any member of Congress who would
not vote that way, after enjoying such an aristocratic and indigest-
ible free lunch would show himself ungrateful, especially when
the millions came not out of his own pocket. Merely reading the
" Menu " was equal to an ordinary meal ; and a stimulant strong
as a common drink was the suggestion artfully scattered through
the bill of fare, about Old London Dock Sherry, Pommery Sec,
Cognac, Liqueurs, and Siberian Punch, to say nothing of Chateau
La Rose, and Chateau Yquem, which I think are wines of rare
and precious vintage ; although for anything I know to the con-
trary they may be the French names for turnips and potatoes, but
I think they are Baronial brands of wine ; nectar that has been
ripening in the cellars of old castles these hundreds and hundreds
of years. The Siberian Punch was poetry in bottles. What in-
spiration it would give to a Tennyson or a Browning, when a couple
of glasses of it could make a newspaper man talk thus, " And so
supper waned and champagne flowed. The immaculate china was
soiled, the flowers withered as eyes grew brighter, and the time
came as it always comes, when desire was satisfied, and when the
things that were good became vanity. And only the curling, evan-
escent blue cloud of the Havanna did not pale upon animal sa-
tiety."
* *
Intoxicated by the "evanescent blue cloud of the Havanna,"
as by voluptuous incense, Mr. Enloe, a member of Congress, I
think from Tennessee, showed his political sagacity and his knowl-
edge of the world by giving to his hosts this most valuable bit of
counsel, " I advise you," said he, " to get the appropriations com-
mittee to come out here and see what you are doing. They are a
lot of men whose brains need enlarging." Mr. Enloe had seen how
the dinner and the Siberian Punch had enlarged the brains of his
colleagues at the feast, and he thought that if the committees on
appropriations could be Chicago's guests for a couple of days their
brains might be enlarged in the same way. Mr. Enloe's advice
ought to be acted on at once, because one member of the appro-
priations committee is worth ten of the other kind ; and the recipe
which Mr. Enloe found so effectual, will be just as good for the
appropriations committees if we can only get them here. Of its
power to enlarge the brain, I had convincing evidence this morn-
ing, when a member of Congress who was at the banquet, was bid-
ding good bye to a friend. " I do not like your Chicago drinks,''
he said ; and when his companion asked him why, he replied thus,
"Well, I had some of them at the banquet last night ; and this
morning, when I tried to scratch the top of my head, I had to
reach up about four feet to get there, my brains were so enlarged."
M. M. Trumbull.
CORRESPONDENCE.
THE PATH OF LEAST RESISTANCE.
To the Editor of The Open Court :—
I WISH to call attention to one or two statements made by
J. C. F. Grumbine in his last article in The Open Court on "The
Present Religious Revolution."
He says, "The right path (meaning the path of action) is
right because it is the path of least resistance, and affords man the
greatest possible and the highest quality of enjoyment." "The
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wrong path is wrong because it is the path of greatest resistance
and affords man the least possible and poorest quality of enjoy-
ment." I cannot agree with him in these statements. There is
truth in the statement that " man must be born anew." Man is
in a constant state of development. He is born with tendencies
and aptitudes founded on all his past in lower conditions. These
tendencies and aptitudes are both good and bad and both mark
alike the paths of least resistance. Constant action will in the
lower conditions form paths of least resistance ; these paths are
carried to a higher condition where they are the natural paths of
least resistance also, but where action along them would bring evil
consequences. Action along the paths of least resistance does not
always "afford the greatest possible and highest quality of enjoy-
ment," nor does action along the paths of greatest resistance " af-
ford the least possible and poorest quality of enjoyment," on the
contrary it may and does often afford just the reverse.
The paths of least and greatest resistance cannot be the de-
termining principles of action. There is a constant changing of
the paths of least and greatest resistance. Our knowledge of the
universe and our relation to it is constantly changing and increas-
ing. As we develop and society grows and develops new relations
are necessitated and there must be corresponding change of action
regardless of the paths of least and greatest resistance.
Minneapolis, Minn. Leroy Berrier.
THE EFFICIENCY OF WOMEN IN FINE WORK.
To the Editor of The Open Court :—
A WATCHMAKER friend of mine surprised me with the infor-
mation that there were no women watchmakers. I told him that
the delicate manipulations required in watchmaking, it would
seem to me, could be best performed by women, but he said that
they were very efficient in such fine work as in the manufacture of
the single parts, but when it came to the assembling of the pieces
and the minute adjustment and general horological judgment,
they had proven themselves incapable.
I think it would be well to ventilate the subject and ascertain




Natural Religion. By the Rev. Tlieo. W. Haven, Ph. D. New
York : Twentieth Century Publishing Company. 1892.
This little book is a collection of fifteen sermons which are
broad as well as religious. The reader will look in vain for the
author's creed, and we are at a loss where to place the reverend
Doctor who must send his articles to The Twentieth Century to find
a publisher. We note the following subjects from the table of
contents: "Normal Living is Religion," " The Religion of Health,''
" The Religion of Mind," "God and Man." Dr. Haven quotes
Christ's word "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see
God." He concludes the article :
" Walk in the light of your eyes, with ears open, of your na-
" tive sense, your judgment and your reason, of pure and spotless
"emotion, and beneath the brightly burning stars of your moral
" sense, and thou shalt behold God."
Other chapters treat of : "Conscience," "Duty," "Heart,"
" Character," etc. In the article " The Moral Sense God-Given,"
the author does not appear to be clear as to the meaning and
origin of conscience, and in the article " Intimations of Irt.morial-
ity" he tells us too little about immortality. He pictures man's
want of a continuance of life, when love kisses the lips of death,
but he stops short when the reader expects to hear the author's
own opinion on immortality.
The appearance of the book is a good sign of the times. There
are not many reverend gentlemen like Dr. Haven. upr,.
SHAKESPEARE AND JOAN OF ARC.
BY LOUIS BELROSE, JR.
" Strumpet" ? Oh, Shakespeare, was your heart so blind ?
What fair ideal is there, all your own.
That casts no shadow by the light of Joan ?
Her love prevailed beyond the strength of mind.
A simple woodland flower, pensive, kind
And fearful till she heard the time make moan
And that great pity on the realm and throne
Grew lily royal over king and hind.
Proud vengeance this on her who turned to sheep
The wolves of Crecy and of Agincourt
!
Was faith in France triumphant infamous ?
Or did you cast the groundlings bait so cheap ?
How well might honest gain of such a sort
Play minion to the gold of Pandarus.
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